LCO 6100 Module 1 Module Paper: Why the First Claims System Rollout Failed Example

Reviewed by Edgar Pennington, MBA Thomas Edison State University Updated October 2026

This LCO 6100 Module 1 example answers the first module paper in Leading Change in Complex Organizations, a course in TESU's Master of Science in Management, including the Organizational Leadership concentration. LCO-6100 opens by asking why organizational change succeeds or fails, using Kotter's account of the eight errors that undermine transformation efforts. Its case is Raritan Valley Mutual, an invented Trenton home and auto insurer whose push to put adjusters on a cloud claims system stalled inside a year. It traces the failure to five of Kotter's errors, weighs the evidence behind the common claim that most changes fail and draws lessons for the second attempt the company is now planning.

CourseLCO-6100 Leading Change in Complex Organizations
ModuleModule 1
Paper typeModule 1 module paper: succeeding or failing at organizational change
LengthAbout 798 words, 5 pages
FormatAPA 7 student paper
SchoolThomas Edison State University
ProgramMaster of Science in Management
UpdatedOctober 2026

Free sample paper for LCO 6100 Module 1

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Five of Eight Errors: Why Raritan Valley Mutual's First Claims System Rollout Failed

Student Name

Master of Science in Management, Thomas Edison State University

LCO-6100: Leading Change in Complex Organizations

Mentor Name

Month Day, Year

What this page is doingThe title names the paper's finding, that the failed effort committed five of the eight errors Kotter describes.
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Five of Eight Errors: Why Raritan Valley Mutual's First Claims System Rollout Failed

Introduction

Raritan Valley Mutual is a composite regional insurer with 1,100 employees, writing home and auto policies in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. In 2021 its leaders bought a cloud-based claims platform meant to let adjusters handle simple claims from photos and replace a paper-heavy process built in the 1990s. Eighteen months later, fewer than a third of eligible claims ran through the new system, adjusters kept parallel spreadsheets and the project sponsor had left the company. Kotter (2012) argues that most failed transformations share a small set of predictable errors, and this paper uses his framework to explain what happened. Interviews with adjusters and supervisors after the rollout, summarized in an internal review, provide the evidence used below.

Error 1: Allowing Too Much Complacency

The company's results in 2021 were good. Claims costs were stable and customer complaints low, so most employees saw no reason to change how they worked. Leaders announced the platform as a modernization project but never showed staff the threat behind it: competitors settling simple auto claims in two days while Garden State took nine. Kotter (2012) places complacency first because without a shared sense of urgency, every later step meets passive resistance. At Garden State, adjusters treated the platform as an option rather than a necessity.

Error 2: Failing to Create a Powerful Guiding Coalition

The project was run by the information technology department, with one vice president of claims as a part-time sponsor. No senior claims managers, no respected frontline adjusters and no one from underwriting or customer service sat on the steering group. When adjusters raised problems, the people who heard them could not change claims procedures, and the people who could change procedures were not involved. Battilana and Casciaro (2012) found that change agents who sit at the center of informal networks are more effective at implementing changes that break with existing practice; the first rollout's IT-led group had no such ties to the claims floor.

Error 3: Underestimating the Power of Vision and Undercommunicating It

The only statement of purpose was a slide promising "a modern claims experience." It did not say what would be different for a customer with a dented bumper or for an adjuster on a Monday morning. Communication consisted of a launch email, two town halls and a training schedule. Kotter (2012) argues that leaders undercommunicate their vision by a factor of ten or more, and that a vision that cannot be explained in five minutes is not ready.

What this page is doingShowing what each error looked like inside this company, rather than restating Kotter's list, is what turns the framework into an analysis.
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Error 4: Permitting Obstacles to Block the New Vision

The largest obstacle was structural. Adjusters were measured on closed files per month, and the new system, with its learning curve, slowed them down at first. Supervisors who saw their teams' numbers fall quietly allowed the old process to continue. The performance system rewarded exactly the behavior the change was meant to end, and no one in the coalition had the authority to change it.

Error 5: Declaring Victory Too Soon

Six months after launch, the IT department reported the project complete because the software was installed and all adjusters had been trained. The steering group disbanded. Adoption then drifted downward as workarounds spread. Kotter (2012) warns that changes sink into a culture only over years, and that celebrating installation as success removes the pressure needed to finish the work.

How Often Does Change Fail?

Garden State's executives, like many, quoted the familiar line that seven in ten changes fail. Hughes (2011) followed that figure back through the literature and found no sound study behind it; it had spread by being repeated. That matters for Garden State. The lesson of its first attempt is not that change usually fails, which would invite fatalism, but that this attempt failed for identifiable reasons that a second attempt can address. Appelbaum et al. (2012) reviewed research on Kotter's model and found broad support for its individual steps, though less evidence for the strict order in which Kotter presents them.

Lessons for the Second Attempt

Three lessons follow. First, urgency must rest on evidence employees find credible, such as customer data, not on executive assertion. Second, the guiding coalition must include claims leaders with authority over procedures and measures, along with respected adjusters. Third, the performance measures must change at the same time as the system, so that using the platform helps adjusters' numbers rather than hurting them. Module 2 develops these first steps into a plan.

Conclusion

Raritan Valley Mutual's first rollout failed because leaders allowed complacency, ran the change through the wrong coalition, never explained the vision, left the old performance measures in place and declared victory at installation. Those errors are specific, and a second attempt that addresses them has a reasonable chance of success.

References

Appelbaum, S. H., Habashy, S., Malo, J.-L., & Shafiq, H. (2012). Back to the future: Revisiting Kotter's 1996 change model. Journal of Management Development, 31(8), 764-782. https://doi.org/10.1108/02621711211253231

Battilana, J., & Casciaro, T. (2012). Change agents, networks, and institutions: A contingency theory of organizational change. Academy of Management Journal, 55(2), 381-398. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2009.0891

Hughes, M. (2011). Do 70 per cent of all organizational change initiatives really fail? Journal of Change Management, 11(4), 451-464. https://doi.org/10.1080/14697017.2011.630506

Kotter, J. P. (2012). Leading change. Harvard Business Review Press.

LCO 6100 Module 1 instructions, in plain terms

LCO-6100 grades its work through discussions, written assignments, reflection exercises, module papers worth 20 percent and a final paper worth 40 percent. The Module 1 paper asks why change succeeds or fails, using Kotter's eight errors and the stories of change in the readings. Most students analyze a change they have seen at work, which gives the paper concrete detail. Choose a change with a clear outcome, explain which errors occurred and how you know, and support the analysis with research beyond Kotter. Avoid listing all eight errors if only some apply; depth on the relevant ones earns more. Name the organization or describe it as a composite if you must protect confidential details, and give enough facts about the change, such as dates, numbers or decisions, for the reader to judge your analysis.

Inside the LCO 6100 Module 1 example

The paper introduces a composite insurer and a failed system rollout with specific numbers on adoption. Five sections each take one of Kotter's errors and show what it looked like inside the company, from the launch slide to the performance measures that rewarded the old process. A section examines the evidence behind the 70 percent failure claim and research on the model's support. Three lessons for a second try follow, and one closing sentence names all five errors. The tone stays analytical rather than blaming: each error is described as a leadership choice with consequences, which models the stance a change leader takes when reviewing a failure.

Reading the LCO 6100 Module 1 grading rubric

Mentors grade module papers on accurate application of course concepts, depth of analysis, use of research and clear APA writing. In this first paper, answers that show how each error appeared in a real organization, with evidence such as adoption figures or meeting structures, show understanding beyond Kotter's list. Questioning the common failure statistic with research demonstrates critical reading. Lessons that follow directly from the analysis, and that set up the next module, show the student is thinking as a change leader, not only as an observer. Clear organization by error, with headings, and correct APA citations make the paper easy to follow and support the grade.

LCO 6100 Module 1 help from the desk

Students lose points by summarizing Kotter's chapter instead of applying it, by blaming failure on resistant employees without examining leadership errors or by repeating the 70 percent figure as fact. Pick the errors that actually occurred and give evidence for each. Look for structural causes, such as performance measures, as well as communication. Cite research that tests Kotter's model. End with lessons a leader could act on. Keep the analysis grounded in what happened rather than what might have happened. A free first sample on your own LCO-6100 Module 1 paper is available on request.

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LCO 6100 Module 1 questions, answered

Where can I find a free LCO 6100 Module 1 sample paper?

Raritan Valley Mutual's failed claims rollout, traced through Kotter's eight errors, is analyzed above.

What are Kotter's eight errors?

Letting complacency stand, a coalition without power, a vision undervalued and then barely communicated, obstacles left untouched, no early wins, celebrating too early and not embedding change in the culture.

Do 70 percent of change efforts fail?

Research tracing that figure found no valid empirical basis for a single failure rate; it spread through repetition.

Why does complacency come first in Kotter's model?

Without a shared sense of urgency, every later step meets passive resistance.

What textbook does LCO-6100 use?

John Kotter's Leading Change, published by Harvard Business Review Press in 2012.