| Course | ACC-5010 Principles of Forensic Accounting |
|---|---|
| Module | Module 3 |
| Paper type | Short paper on fraud prevention and detection |
| Length | About 958 words, 6 pages |
| Format | APA 7 student paper |
| School | Thomas Edison State University |
| Program | Master of Science in Accounting |
| Updated | October 2026 |
Free sample paper for ACC 5010 Module 3
Steered Contracts at the Parks Department: Why a Kickback Scheme Lasted Four Years and What Would Have Stopped It
Student Name
Master of Science in Accounting, Thomas Edison State University
ACC-5010: Principles of Forensic Accounting
Mentor Name
Month Day, Year
Steered Contracts at the Parks Department: Why a Kickback Scheme Lasted Four Years and What Would Have Stopped It
Introduction
Corruption is easy to underestimate because it leaves the books looking normal: invoices are real, services are delivered and payments are approved. The loss hides in prices that are a little too high and in competitors who stopped bidding. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) found in its 2024 study of nearly 2,000 occupational fraud cases that corruption appeared in close to half of them and that the median case ran about a year before detection (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners [ACFE], 2024). This paper examines one such scheme.
The Scheme
For four years, the parks department's purchasing supervisor, who had authority to solicit quotes for contracts under the county's formal bidding threshold, directed mowing, trail maintenance and equipment supply work to Ridgeback Grounds, a company owned by a friend. He split larger jobs into pieces below the threshold, sent requests for quotes to two firms he knew would bid high or not at all, and approved Ridgeback's invoices himself. In return, Ridgeback's owner paid him cash after each quarter, about 15 percent of the contract value. Over four years the county paid Ridgeback about $1.24 million, of which roughly $186,000 went back to the supervisor and an estimated further $120,000 represented prices above what competitive bidding would have produced.
Why It Happened: Fraud Theory
Cressey's fraud triangle explains occupational fraud through three conditions: pressure, opportunity and rationalization. The supervisor had pressure in the form of gambling debts that coworkers later described. He had opportunity because one person controlled quote solicitation, vendor selection and invoice approval for small contracts. And he rationalized the payments as consulting fees for helping a small local business, telling himself the county still got its grass cut.
Later work refined the model. Dorminey et al. (2012) trace how fraud theory moved beyond the triangle to include the capability of the perpetrator, the idea behind the fraud diamond, and to distinguish accidental fraudsters from predators who seek out positions to exploit. The supervisor fits the capability element closely: he understood the bidding threshold and the approval workflow well enough to design a scheme around them. That matters for prevention, because controls that rely on the honesty of capable insiders will fail against someone who knows exactly where they are weak.
How It Was Detected
The scheme surfaced when a bookkeeper at a losing bidder called the county's ethics line to report that her employer had been told it was wasting time quoting on parks work. The ACFE's research consistently finds tips to be the most common detection method, accounting for more than 40 percent of cases in its 2024 report, with employees the largest source, followed by customers and vendors (ACFE, 2024). The county's hotline was publicized to employees but not to vendors, so the tip came nearly by accident. Internal audit then compared contract awards over four years and found that Ridgeback had won 71 percent of sub-threshold parks contracts, against 9 percent for the next most frequent vendor, and that the timing of split jobs clustered just under the threshold.
Estimating the County's Loss
The county's loss has two parts, and they are measured differently. The kickbacks themselves, about $186,000, can be traced through the supervisor's cash deposits, which spiked after each quarterly Ridgeback payment, and through the vendor owner's withdrawals. The overcharge is harder to prove because no competitive price exists for contracts that were never properly bid. Internal audit estimated it by comparing Ridgeback's rates with prices other vendors charged neighboring townships for similar mowing and trail work, which suggested Ridgeback billed about 11 percent more, roughly $120,000 over four years. Because that figure rests on comparisons, it would be presented as an estimate with its method disclosed, while the kickback amount rests on bank records and would support a criminal charge.
Control Failures
| Weakness | How the supervisor used it | Missing control |
|---|---|---|
| One person solicited quotes, chose vendors and approved invoices | Controlled every step of the purchase | Separation of duties across solicitation, award and payment |
| No review of split purchases | Broke jobs into pieces below the bidding threshold | Analytics flagging related purchases near the threshold |
| Quotes accepted without verification | Invited firms unlikely to compete | Independent quote solicitation from a rotating vendor list |
| Hotline publicized only internally | Vendors who saw the pattern had no channel | Vendor-facing reporting line in every solicitation |
| No vendor award monitoring | Ridgeback's dominance went unnoticed for years | Quarterly review of award concentration by department |
A Prevention and Detection Program
Five measures follow from the scheme and from the evidence on what works. First, separate the steps of purchasing so that no one person can solicit, award and approve. Second, run monthly analytics on purchases near bidding thresholds, award concentration and vendors sharing addresses, phone numbers or bank accounts with employees. Third, publicize the ethics line to vendors in every request for quotes and contract, since vendors often see corruption first. Fourth, require annual conflict of interest disclosures and gift reporting from purchasing staff. Fifth, conduct occasional surprise reviews of small contracts, because the perceived chance of detection deters capable insiders more than written policies do. The ACFE reports that organizations with controls such as hotlines, surprise audits and proactive data monitoring suffered lower median losses and detected fraud faster than organizations without them (ACFE, 2024).
Conclusion
The parks department's scheme lasted four years because one capable employee controlled every step of small purchases and the people best placed to see the pattern had no easy way to report it. Separation of duties, analytics on thresholds and award concentration, and a vendor-facing hotline would have prevented the scheme or exposed it far sooner (Crain et al., 2019).
References
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. (2024). Occupational fraud 2024: A report to the nations. ACFE.
Crain, M. A., Hopwood, W. S., Gendler, R. S., Young, G. R., & Pacini, C. (2019). Essentials of forensic accounting (2nd ed.). John Wiley & Sons.
Dorminey, J., Fleming, A. S., Kranacher, M. J., & Riley, R. A. (2012). The evolution of fraud theory. Issues in Accounting Education, 27(2), 555-579. https://doi.org/10.2308/iace-50131
ACC 5010 Module 3 instructions, in plain terms
The third module's short paper is one of four that together weigh 40 percent, and the module adds case study questions as well. The module covers fraud theory, the main categories of occupational fraud, how frauds are detected and the controls that prevent and expose them. Prompts here usually hand you a scheme, or let you pick one, and ask why it happened, how it came to light and what would have stopped it. This sample analyzes an invented corruption case in a county government; your prompt may specify a scheme type, an industry or a published case. Your mentor may also ask which of the ACFE's scheme categories the case falls into, so name it explicitly.
How this ACC 5010 Module 3 example is built
The paper opens by explaining why corruption is hard to see and grounding its prevalence in the ACFE's 2024 study. The scheme itself is laid out with dollar figures and the exact steps the supervisor took, giving the theory something concrete to explain. The fraud theory section applies each element of the triangle to the facts and then shows what later refinements, especially capability, add to understanding the case. The detection section explains how the tip arrived and how analytics confirmed it, with evidence on how frauds are usually found. A table connects each weakness to how it was exploited and the missing control, and the prevention program answers those weaknesses one by one.
Where the marks sit in the ACC 5010 Module 3 rubric
Mentors score each ACC-5010 short paper from 0 to 100, and the four together carry 40 percent of the course grade. On a fraud prevention paper, they look for fraud theory applied accurately to specific facts, a clear account of detection, control weaknesses identified precisely and recommendations that respond to them with support from research such as the ACFE's studies. Specific amounts and mechanisms make the analysis credible. Papers lose points when they define the fraud triangle without applying it, recommend generic controls unrelated to the scheme or cite statistics without a source and year. Clear headings and APA citations complete the expectations.
ACC 5010 Module 3 help: mistakes that cost marks
Fraud papers often spend half their length defining the fraud triangle. One paragraph of theory is enough if each element is tied to a fact in the case. Be specific about the scheme: who did what, with which documents, over how long and for how much. When recommending controls, start from the weaknesses the scheme exploited and explain how each control would have stopped or exposed it. Cite current ACFE figures with the report year, since they change with each edition. Keep any real people or organizations described accurately or use a composite. If you would like a short paper analyzing the scheme your prompt names, a writer can draft it, starting with a free first sample.
Write yours, or have the desk draft it
This paper is an original model document written by our desk, not a submitted student paper and not an official Thomas Edison State University document. Read it for the moves, then write your own to the instructions in your classroom. If you want one built to your exact prompt and rubric, the first custom sample is free and arrives in 24 to 48 hours.
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ACC 5010 Module 3 questions, answered
Where can I find a free ACC 5010 Module 3 sample paper?
The parks department kickback paper is reproduced above: the scheme, fraud theory applied to it, how a tip exposed it, a table of control failures and a five-part prevention program.
What is the fraud triangle?
Cressey's model holding that occupational fraud requires pressure, opportunity and rationalization; later refinements add the perpetrator's capability.
How are most occupational frauds detected?
Tips are the most common detection method in the ACFE's studies, accounting for more than 40 percent of cases in its 2024 report, most often from employees.
What controls reduce corruption in purchasing?
Separating solicitation, award and payment, analyzing purchases near bidding thresholds, monitoring vendor concentration, vendor-facing hotlines and conflict of interest disclosures.
What is bid splitting?
Breaking a purchase into smaller pieces so each falls below the threshold that would require formal competitive bidding.