NUR 8420 Module 5 Outcomes Management Paper: Sepsis Measures, Sepsis-3 and Clinical Surveillance Data Example

Reviewed by Gwyneth Ollerton, MSN, RN Thomas Edison State University Updated October 2026

Outcomes management for sepsis is examined in this NUR 8420 Module 5 sample paper, in which an invented Elizabeth hospital discovers that its rising sepsis counts and falling sepsis mortality reflect coding changes more than better care. Shaped for TESU's DNP course on organizational and systems leadership, the paper defines sepsis with the Sepsis-3 consensus, uses a New York State study of 49,331 patients in which longer time to complete the three-hour bundle and to give antibiotics was tied to higher risk-adjusted mortality and draws on national data showing that claims inflated sepsis trends while clinical criteria did not. A surveillance definition, risk-adjusted measures and a monthly review close this NUR-8420 paper.

CourseNUR-8420 Organizational and Systems Leadership II
ModuleModule 5
Paper typeOutcomes paper: measuring and managing sepsis outcomes
LengthAbout 1,024 words, 6 pages
FormatAPA 7 student paper
SchoolThomas Edison State University
ProgramDoctor of Nursing Practice
UpdatedOctober 2026

Free sample paper for NUR 8420 Module 5

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Counting Sepsis Honestly: Building an Outcomes Program on Clinical Data at an Elizabeth Hospital

Student Name

Doctor of Nursing Practice, Thomas Edison State University

NUR-8420: Organizational and Systems Leadership II

Mentor Name

Month Day, Year

What this page is doingThe title points to the central problem the paper solves, that the hospital's sepsis numbers rose and its death rate fell for reasons that had more to do with coding than with care.
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Counting Sepsis Honestly: Building an Outcomes Program on Clinical Data at an Elizabeth Hospital

The Problem With the Numbers

The hospital in this paper is invented: 410 beds in Elizabeth, a busy emergency department and a large population of older adults and nursing home residents. Over five years, the number of patients coded with sepsis rose by more than half while sepsis mortality fell from 21 percent to 13 percent. The board celebrated the trend. The new director of clinical outcomes, a nurse with a DNP, was asked to explain it and found that most of the change came from documentation. A coding improvement program had taught physicians to name sepsis in their notes, adding many milder cases to the count and lowering the death rate without any change in how sick patients fared.

She proposed an outcomes program that would measure sepsis the same way every year, adjust for how sick patients were and connect results to the care processes most likely to change them.

Defining the Outcome

Singer et al. (2016) published Sepsis-3, the third consensus on how sepsis and septic shock should be defined. Under the new wording, sepsis means that the body's own reaction to an infection has gone wrong badly enough to damage organs and endanger life. It identified that dysfunction by an acute increase of at least two points on the SOFA score, which grades failure across six organ systems. Septic shock was reserved for sepsis in which, even after adequate fluids, vasopressors are needed to hold mean arterial pressure at 65 or higher and lactate stays above 2 mmol/L; more than 40 percent of these patients die in the hospital. The task force also offered the quick score, which flags a patient showing two of three signs (a respiratory rate of at least 22, new confusion or drowsiness, a systolic pressure of 100 or below), as a bedside prompt to look for sepsis outside the ICU.

The definition matters for outcomes because it ties sepsis to organ dysfunction, which can be measured from clinical data, rather than to a diagnosis that depends on how a physician chose to write a note.

Why Claims Data Mislead

Rhee et al. (2017) compared sepsis trends from claims with trends from clinical data in 409 hospitals from 2009 to 2014. Using clinical indicators, a blood culture, at least four days of new antibiotics and new organ dysfunction, they found sepsis in about 6 percent of adult hospitalizations, with about 15 percent dying in the hospital and 21 percent dying or going to hospice. By clinical criteria, the incidence of sepsis was stable over the period, while the claims-based incidence climbed by about 10 percent a year. Mortality fell by both measures, but much less by clinical criteria, and the combined outcome of death or discharge to hospice did not change significantly.

The Elizabeth hospital's numbers followed the national pattern. Claims showed a rising, less deadly disease; clinical data would likely show a steady one.

What this page is doingThe paper explains why the board's good news was misleading before proposing new measures. Mentors credit an author who checks the data definition before trusting a trend.
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Which Processes Matter

Seymour et al. (2017) studied 49,331 patients with sepsis and septic shock at 149 New York hospitals after the state required sepsis protocols. Most patients, 82.5 percent, had the three-hour bundle of blood cultures, a lactate and broad-spectrum antibiotics completed within three hours. Among patients whose bundle was completed within 12 hours, every extra hour before the bundle was finished carried higher adjusted odds of in-hospital death, and the same was true for every extra hour before antibiotics. Time to completion of an intravenous fluid bolus was not significantly associated with mortality.

The study supports measuring time to antibiotics as the process most closely tied to survival. It also cautions against treating every bundle element as equally important.

The Outcomes Program

The surveillance definition follows Rhee and colleagues so that results stay comparable from year to year regardless of coding. Death or discharge to hospice is the primary outcome, because hospice transfers can make in-hospital death rates look better than they are. Results are reported quarterly as observed and expected deaths, with run charts. Cases are split into those present on admission and those that begin in the hospital, because the second group says more about the hospital's own care.

ElementDefinitionData source
Sepsis caseBlood culture, at least 4 days of new antibiotics, new organ dysfunctionElectronic record, automated
Primary outcomeIn-hospital death or discharge to hospiceDischarge record
Risk adjustmentAge, comorbidities, organ dysfunction at onset, source of infection, admission from nursing homeElectronic record
Key processTime from emergency triage to first antibiotic doseMedication administration record
Balancing measureAntibiotic starts in patients later found not to have infectionPharmacy data
What this page is doingThe balancing measure watches for harm from faster antibiotics. Graders look for a plan that measures what could go wrong with the push for speed.
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Using the Results

The outcomes director also changed what the board sees. Instead of a single sepsis mortality figure, the board receives the observed-to-expected ratio for death or hospice discharge, the median time to antibiotics and the balancing measure on one page, each with two years of monthly data. A short note explains any change in definitions, so a coding change cannot again look like an improvement in care.

A monthly sepsis review meeting, led by the outcomes director with emergency, ICU and hospital medicine leaders, reviews every death within the surveillance definition and every case where antibiotics took more than three hours. The meeting looks for patterns, such as delays on night shift or among patients admitted from nursing homes, and assigns a unit to test one change each quarter.

Limits

The hospital's first year of surveillance data will be compared with three years of reconstructed history, built by running the same definition on archived records, which may be less complete. Clinical surveillance misses patients treated for fewer than four days who die early, and risk adjustment from record data cannot capture everything about how sick a patient was. Observational links between time and mortality cannot prove that faster care caused better survival.

Conclusion

The hospital's sepsis improvement was largely an artifact of coding. A clinical definition aligned with Sepsis-3, an outcome that counts hospice discharges and a key process supported by state-wide evidence give the hospital a stable way to see whether patients are actually doing better.

References

Rhee, C., Dantes, R., Epstein, L., Murphy, D. J., Seymour, C. W., Iwashyna, T. J., Kadri, S. S., Angus, D. C., Danner, R. L., Fiore, A. E., Jernigan, J. A., Martin, G. S., Septimus, E., Warren, D. K., Karcz, A., Chan, C., Menchaca, J. T., Wang, R., Gruber, S., & Klompas, M. (2017). Incidence and trends of sepsis in US hospitals using clinical vs claims data, 2009-2014. JAMA, 318(13), 1241-1249. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2017.13836

Seymour, C. W., Gesten, F., Prescott, H. C., Friedrich, M. E., Iwashyna, T. J., Phillips, G. S., Lemeshow, S., Osborn, T., Terry, K. M., & Levy, M. M. (2017). Time to treatment and mortality during mandated emergency care for sepsis. New England Journal of Medicine, 376(23), 2235-2244. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1703058

Singer, M., Deutschman, C. S., Seymour, C. W., Shankar-Hari, M., Annane, D., Bauer, M., Bellomo, R., Bernard, G. R., Chiche, J. D., Coopersmith, C. M., Hotchkiss, R. S., Levy, M. M., Marshall, J. C., Martin, G. S., Opal, S. M., Rubenfeld, G. D., van der Poll, T., Vincent, J. L., & Angus, D. C. (2016). The Third International Consensus Definitions for Sepsis and Septic Shock (Sepsis-3). JAMA, 315(8), 801-810. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2016.0287

NUR 8420 Module 5 instructions, in plain terms

Outcomes management methods and the measurement tools and data elements that support them are named in TESU's catalog description of NUR-8420, and since the syllabus is held within the course, module five is planned as an outcomes management paper for one high-risk condition. A paper of this kind defines the outcome precisely, chooses measures and data elements and explains why, addresses risk adjustment and the limits of each data source, links outcomes to the processes most likely to change them and describes how results will be reviewed and used. Other sections focus on heart failure, falls or surgical site infection. Check whether a measure table or data dictionary is required and whether the paper should follow a named outcomes management model.

Inside the NUR 8420 Module 5 example

The invented Elizabeth hospital's rising sepsis counts and falling death rate open the paper, along with the discovery that coding drove the change. Sepsis-3 provides the definition. A national comparison of claims and clinical data explains why the board's trend was misleading, and a statewide study identifies time to antibiotics as the key process. A five-row table defines the program's case, outcome, risk adjustment, key process and balancing measure, each with its data source. A monthly review, limits and a conclusion follow. Annotations explain why the data were questioned first and why a balancing measure guards against harm from speed. A one-page board report replaces the single mortality figure.

Where the marks sit in the NUR 8420 Module 5 rubric

Mentors judge an outcomes management paper by the precision of its outcome definition, the fit between measures and data sources, an honest account of risk adjustment and data limits, a link between outcomes and changeable processes and a clear plan for review and action. Credit goes to papers that question a favorable trend before accepting it. Including a balancing measure shows awareness that improvement efforts can cause harm. Distinguishing conditions present on admission from those acquired in the hospital is often noted. Published figures should match their sources, consensus definitions should be quoted accurately, and any change in definition should be flagged on every report.

Common NUR 8420 Module 5 mistakes, and how to avoid them

A frequent problem is picking measures for convenience, because the data already exist, instead of because they capture the outcome; start from the definition. Another is reporting raw rates without risk adjustment. Name every data source and what it misses, from coding rules to records that never reach the hospital. Pair each process measure with evidence that it affects the outcome. Add at least one balancing measure. Show leaders observed and expected results rather than raw rates. Say plainly what your data cannot show. The Elizabeth sepsis program is one model, and a first draft for your condition and setting, written to your instructions, is free.

Write yours, or have the desk draft it

This paper is an original model document written by our desk, not a submitted student paper and not an official Thomas Edison State University document. Read it for the moves, then write your own to the instructions in your classroom. If you want one built to your exact prompt and rubric, the first custom sample is free and arrives in 24 to 48 hours.

More NUR 8420 and Doctor of Nursing Practice sample papers

NUR 8420 Module 5 questions, answered

Where can I find a free NUR 8420 Module 5 sample paper?

The sepsis outcomes paper for an invented Elizabeth hospital, from the misleading trend to the monitoring plan, can be read in full above.

How does Sepsis-3 define sepsis?

Sepsis-3 calls it infection that has tipped the body's response into dangerous organ dysfunction, marked by a SOFA score that climbs two points or more.

Why can claims data overstate sepsis trends?

Coding practices change; a national study found claims-based sepsis rising about 10 percent a year while clinical criteria showed a stable incidence.

Which sepsis process is most closely tied to survival?

In New York data, each hour to antibiotics and to bundle completion was linked with higher mortality, while time to a fluid bolus was not significantly linked.

What is a balancing measure?

A counterweight measure that checks whether an improvement push is causing harm elsewhere, for example antibiotics started in patients who never had an infection.